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Abstract
If physics is a science that unveils the fundamental laws of nature, then
the appearance of mathematical concepts in its language can be surprising
or even mysterious. This was Eugene Wigner’s argument in 1960. I show
that another approach to physical theory accommodates mathematics in
a perfectly reasonable way. To explore unknown processes or phenom-
ena, one builds a theory from fundamental principles, employing them as
constraints within a general mathematical framework. The rise of such
theories of the unknown, which I call blackbox models, drives home the
unsurprising effectiveness of mathematics. I illustrate it on the exam-
ples of Einstein’s principle theories, the S-matrix approach in quantum
field theory, effective field theories, and device-independent approaches in
quantum information.
1 Introduction
“The enormous usefulness of mathematics in the natural sciences is some-
thing bordering on the mysterious. . . [T]here is no rational explanation for
it,” wrote Eugene Wigner in a well-known article in 1960 [55]. Above all,
this “unreasonable” effectiveness manifests itself in physics. The latter,
for Wigner, is devoted to “discovering the laws of inanimate nature.” This
view of physics, widespread but also challenged several times during the
20th century, relies on the concept of “law of nature” in a fundamental
way. Any such law applies to one or several kinds of inanimate matter
and describes their dynamical evolution. Physics is seen, then, as a study
of natural phenomena by first deducing and subsequently applying corre-
sponding general laws. The overarching aim of the laws is to enable the
prediction of future events. Wigner wonders why this goal happens to be
aligned with an apparently different one, that of mathematics, which he
describes as selecting concepts that are “amenable to clever manipulations
[in producing] striking, brilliant arguments.” If one takes for granted that
mathematical thinking is exclusively concerned with a search for such
arguments, it may indeed seem mysterious that the mathematical con-
cepts and formulae should be useful in facilitating the prediction of future
events.
I submit that the effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences is
perfectly reasonable and rational if one adopts a different view of physical
theory. The aim of prediction of future observations, for sure, remains;
but the substance changes. This view applies whenever the object of
study involves phenomena or processes whose nature remains unknown.
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In these circumstances, physicists are not in position to say what kind of
matter is involved but they are nevertheless eager to build a theory. In
order to do so, they employ fundamental principles tasked with limiting
the possibilities in a theoretical description of unknown facts. For short,
this approach will be named ‘blackbox models.’ Its main feature is that
physical theory is to be constrained by universal principles rather than
dynamical laws. On this point the blackbox approach complements, but
does not contradict, Wigner’s conception of physics. It is now broadly
used, with applications spanning more than a century of research work
that gave birth to new physical theories and discoveries. I illustrate the
importance of this physics of the unknown on four examples: Einstein’s
principle theories (Section 2), S-matrix (Section 3), effective field theories
(Section 4), and device-independent approaches (Section 5).
On the basis of these four case studies I argue in Section 6 that the
effectiveness of mathematics in blackbox models is neither surprising nor
unreasonable. Blackbox models leave no room for Wignerian amazement
because their success depends on mathematics as a driving force of the-
oretic construction. Yet they are predictive, as required of physics, and
also explanatory. That physical explanation can be provided by blackbox
models is precisely the missing element in Wigner’s view: these models
do not seek to establish a law of nature, however their explanatory power
is as real as that of constructive, dynamical theories. Combined with the
constitutive role of mathematical concepts in blackbox models, it clears
away the cloud of mystery over the use of mathematics.
2 Principle theories
In 1919 Einstein made a well-known distinction between principle and
constructive theories [20]. Constructive theories match Wigner’s view of
physics: they contain dynamical laws describing the behaviour of particu-
lar kinds of matter, e.g., Newton’s laws for the movement of rigid bodies.
Since their aim: employing laws to predict future events, is different from
the aim of mathematics, Wigner’s claim to surprising effectiveness fully
applies to constructive theories. By contrast, a principle theory, e.g., Ein-
stein’s own special relativity, is a theory derived from simple postulates.
It does not begin with an assumption about the type of matter or its
dynamics; these become consequences of the postulates rather than theo-
retical prerequisites. The postulates are formulated as universal physical
principles and are expressed in the formalism as mathematical axioms.
For example, the relativity principle or the independence of the speed
of light of the reference frame in which it is measured play the role of
fundamental principles in Einstein’s relativity theory. A different set of
postulates may begin with setting an upper limit on velocities [26, 25].
A modern avatar of these postulates, called no-signalling, stipulates that
in an experimental setting with two observers the choice of measurement
by one party must not influence the statistics of the outcomes registered
by a different party. It is widely used in device-independent approaches
for introducing constraints on operations with quantum information (see
Section 5). The interest of this formulation is that it is entirely non-
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dynamical: no-signalling is an algebraic condition expressed in the lan-
guage of conditional probability. At best it receives a kinematic — but
not a dynamical — expression.
To use Einstein’s own words about principle theories, the principles
are employed in them in order to “narrow the possibilities” [18]. This
means that one should begin the model-building exercise by adopting a
very inclusive framework that can encompass the unknown phenomena
in question but also much more. This framework may possibly extend
beyond what has been or can be experimentally observed at the current
stage of technological development. The point of choosing this starting
point is that a broad framework can accommodate a yet unspecified the-
ory with unpredictable empirical consequences. Principles, then, limit
the possibilities and serve to narrow the framework down to a particular
model. For example, no-signalling excludes faster-than-light travel in a
geometric framework with a preselected spacetime, either Euclidean or
Minkowski, or in the Riemannian way of introducing a spacetime man-
ifold and arbitrary Riemannian metric. In a non-dynamical framework
which does not begin with a geometric object, the very notion of ‘travel’
might be undefined. Here, the no-signalling principle helps to make sure
that a purely algebraic model will not produce a contradiction with the
theory of relativity when it is applied for the description of real-world phe-
nomena. The impossibility of faster-than-light signalling is “elevated” [27,
p. 88] to the status of universal postulate even in the absence of geometric
assumptions. It then becomes a fundamental principle of nature and a
constitutive feature of physical theories.
Einstein’s own road to the distinction between principle and construc-
tive theories was a challenging one. After his 1905 article describing the
photoelectric effect in terms of light quanta [19], his belief in the funda-
mental character and the exact validity of Maxwell’s electrodynamics was
destabilized. As he wrote in the 1949 Autobiographical Notes,
Reflections of this type [on the dual wave-particle nature of
radiation] made it clear to me as long ago as shortly after
1900, i.e., shortly after Planck’s trailblazing work, that neither
mechanics nor electrodynamics could (except in limiting cases)
claim exact validity. By and by I despaired of the possibility
of discovering the true laws by means of constructive efforts
based on known facts. [21, p. 51, 53]
This “desperation” led Einstein to special relativity. To find the theory,
he looked for one that would not be based on “known facts.” Special
relativity, indeed, remains mute on the issue of material constitution of
the rods and clocks that act as measurement devices.
There is good evidence that Einstein believed that this lack of con-
structivity was a disadvantage and that principle theories did not offer a
satisfactory understanding of physics [11, 28]. This claim has been chal-
lenged recently via a comparison with James Jeans’s position [36] but
another, more seasoned critique focuses on the status of general relativity.
According to Brown, it should be seen as a constructive theory since it
contains a dynamical law [10]. Without entering the debate on construc-
tive relativity, I would like to emphasize the importance of the argument
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from explanatory power. The capacity to explain phenomena was uncon-
troversially ascribed by Einstein only to constructive theories: “When we
say we have succeeded in understanding a group of natural processes, we
invariably mean that a constructive theory has been found which covers
the processes in question“ [20]. Einstein wished to build an explanatory
account based on known facts but despaired to do so. In his time and
later, the desideratum to obtain a constructive theory as a replacement
of principle-based special relativity never came to be realized.
To be sure, constructive theories are still widely in use. What has
changed since the time of Einstein’s tergiversations is that principle the-
ories are now taken to be explanatory. They are capable of giving an
understanding of physics on a par with constructive theories, i.e., they
can underlie theoretical knowledge as well as experimental setups (e.g.,
in quantum cryptography, see Section 5). That physical knowledge can
be gained through the pursuit of a principle-based approach has helped
to legitimize it, not only as a widespread method on sociological grounds,
but also on the grounds of epistemology as an approach that is explana-
tory. Its key method: the choice of a broad framework and its subse-
quent narrowing down through limiting principles, which is at the same
time an application of mathematics to physics and the enabling force be-
hind theory-building and ultimately behind explanation. A conjunction
of these two factors showcases a paradigm of physical theory in which
it is perfectly reasonable to assign the central methodological place to
mathematics.
3 S-matrix
In the years before quantum electrodynamics and subsequently quantum
chromodynamics were fully developed it had not been clear that a field-
theoretic approach would be successful in accounting for the electromag-
netic, the weak and the strong interactions. In the early 1950s, for exam-
ple, it was not obvious to the physics community whether the method of
quantum field theory (QFT) based on gauge symmetry would be an appro-
priate framework for building the theory of strong interactions. A similar
uncertainty plagued quantum electrodynamics a decade earlier. In 1954,
same year as the work by Yang and Mills, during a conference discussion
in the presence of Oppenheimer, Gell-Mann, Fermi, Wick, and Dyson,
Goldberger challenged the applicability of QFT methods to nuclear inter-
actions. Surprisingly, nobody in the audience spoke to the contrary [39].
This episode was still remembered in the 1970s as a typical example of
early doubts about the future of quantum field theory [2].
The doubts about the applicability of QFT were prevalent because of
renormalizability issues. In response physicists began to look for methods
to build a theory that did not assume any known particle content lead-
ing to divergencies. The main idea of this approach was borrowed from
Heisenberg’s philosophical program in the 1920s, which prescribed that
a theory should focus only on observable quantities. This idea proved
to be extremely successful in the discovery of quantum mechanics [32].
The hope was that the same approach would again produce a crucial in-
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sight. As Weinberg wrote, the physicists of the generation before his own
believed that “by using principles of unitarity, analyticity, Lorentz invari-
ance and other symmetries, it would be possible to calculate the S-matrix,
and you would never have to think about a quantum field” [52, p. 248].
Indeed, history has largely followed this prescription in developing the
way in which our current physical theories with unknown particle content
are constructed. One detail of this approach presents a particular philo-
sophical interest. For a theoretician, the central question bears on the
mathematical content of the theory: what mathematical concepts should
one use to represent observable quantities? What physical constraints are
to be imposed on such representatives? The success of the theory-building
exercise is directly dependent on finding a framework in which the con-
nection between mathematical concepts will turn out to have predictive
power.
In 1937 John Wheeler introduced one such mathematical concept,
which he called the scattering matrix, later to be known as S-matrix [54].
Wheeler’s initial intent was to develop a mathematical method of “res-
onating group structure” that would allow one to build a description of the
whole interacting system of elementary particles from the knowledge of its
parts. This did not fully work out. Wheeler, however, obtained a result
suggesting that the problem as he had formulated it could in fact be by-
passed: “The connection which we have obtained between the scattering
and disintegration cross sections does not depend for its validity on the ac-
curacy of what we have called the method of resonating group structure.”
The scattering matrix that involved the cross sections depended only on
some general asymptotic properties but not on the details of the interact-
ing compound system. Among the general arguments used by Wheeler
one mainly finds symmetry considerations credited by him to Bohr and
Jordan. In the wake of Heisenberg’s quantum mechanics, Wheeler’s work
provided a new example of a physical theory of unknown interactions,
which involved exclusively the observables. It was built through the in-
troduction of a new mathematical object. Wheeler published the results
but did not pursue his method further; only much later did his scattering
matrix become known as a precursor of the S-matrix theory of strong
interactions [38, p. 990].
Between 1942 and 1944 Heisenberg, who did not know about Wheeler’s
work, wrote a series of three articles in Zeitschrift fu¨r Physik explicitly
pursuing the goal of building a theory of unknown physics. The reason
why the constructive physical content had to be taken as unknown, ac-
cording to Heisenberg, was that the theory could change in the future:
In view of the later alteration [Aba¨nderung] of the theory, the
present investigation attempts to isolate from the conceptual
scheme of the quantum theory of wave fields those concepts
which probably will not be affected by the future changes [in
the theory of elementary particles] and which may therefore
represent an integral part [Bestandteil] also of the future the-
ory. [34]
The concepts that Heisenberg thought would not be affected by a future
theory change were the observable quantities. He admitted although, in
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an indisputable influence of his earlier discussions with Einstein, that ‘only
the final theory will decide which quantities are “really observable.”’ As
early as 1938, simultaneously with Wheeler but independently, Heisenberg
wrote:
Perhaps one may remember to advantage, in attempting to
find new concepts, that in mathematical formulae, we are now
confronted with the task of finding computational rules, by
which we can connect the cross sections. . . [33]
This stance, to quote the historian Helmut Rechenberg, was a consequence
of the fact that “one did not yet know how to formulate a divergence-free
theory describing elementary particles” [46]. Heisenberg’s conviction was
that the right theory would contain a minimal length. It was not im-
mediately clear, however, how one was supposed to introduce such mini-
mal length in QFT. Heisenberg reasonably believed that the asymptotic
results, because they belong among observable quantities that the the-
ory must be able to predict, should remain independent of the minimal
length. While working out a complete theory remained a matter for fu-
ture research, it was possible to introduce a direct connection between the
momenta and the energies of free particles and the scattering and reaction
cross sections. The connection was to be expressed mathematically: “It
seemed appropriate to find a mathematical [our emphasis - AG] object
capable of housing these observable quantities. Heisenberg realized that
the momentum space kernel of the probability amplitude for transitions
between free particle states was the object he wanted” [31]. Thus Heisen-
berg introduced a unitary ‘characteristic’ S-matrix becoming the founding
father of the S-matrix approach in theoretical physics.
Heisenberg’s S-matrix met fierce opposition from Wolfgang Pauli. He
believed that it could not be fundamental, because the way the approach
was constructed did not rely on arguments from simplicity and, in fact,
produced a result that was anything but simple:
In general I have arrived at the opinion that the S-matrix is not
a concept, of which we may expect that it occurs in a future
theory as a primary fundamental concept. It indeed has the
character of something complicated and derived and therefore
might hardly be suitable to lead us beyond the present wave
mechanics. [40]
This lack of simplicity underwrote Pauli’s conviction that the S-matrix
could not be a part of the laws of nature. It seems that Pauli believed
that for reasons of mathematical elegance a law of nature should have a
simple expression. He then concluded:
The S-matrix, although it might exist in a future theory, seems
to be completely unfit to constitute the point of departure for
a [new] theory. It is not the quantity which will occur in the
general laws of nature, but a late consequence of them. [41]
This reveals a tension between two approaches to physical theory, each
pushing toward a different role of mathematical formalism. Pauli wished
to have a theory containing laws of nature, i.e., dynamical rules of evo-
lution of particular kinds of matter. If a law is found, e.g., describing
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light quanta, and if this law has a mathematical expression, then it is
perfectly legitimate to wonder, as Wigner did, why mathematics would
be so effective in describing their behaviour. It is even more surprising
that mathematics is equally effective in describing the evolution of directly
perceivable objects like tables or chairs. Whatever answer one may give
to this Wignerian wonder, the theory in question is, in Einstein’s terms,
a constructive one.
The situation is different for principle theories. They explore unknown
territories, which cannot yet be accounted for in terms of a particular kind
of matter, let alone a law of its dynamical evolution. The S-matrix, as
Wheeler discovered, bypasses the problem of “resonating group structure,”
which would describe the content of the theory in terms of interacting
particles. Similarly, Heisenberg’s focus on observable quantities does not
require a physical description of how one such observable gets dynamically
converted into another. The middle ground can remain unknown—a black
box—while mathematical relations will still be available describing the
relation between the observables. This is a clear sign that mathematics
in a principle theory is not playing the role of underwriting the laws of
nature, as Wigner thought, but rather of letting a theory of the unknown
to be built in the first place. When Gregor Wentzel called the S-matrix
program “very incomplete—it is like an empty frame for a picture yet
to be painted” [53], he believed to be giving a pejorative assessment of
Heisenberg’s program. In fact, he put his finger on the main feature
of principle theories: a physical theory is possible without filling in “an
empty frame” or opening up a black box.
The S-matrix theory of nuclear interactions has become history after
the advent of quantum chromodynamics but the S-matrix approach is still
well and alive. In quantum gravity, for example, it is used for constructing
low-energy models of supergravity from high-energy theories like string
theory. String theory itself was discovered by Veneziano as a consequence
of his work on the S-matrix approach, when he used general principles
to correctly guess the unknown amplitudes satisfying duality properties,
which described the excitations of a one-dimensional object [48]. One can
use this all-encompassing theory of quantum gravity to construct low-
energy gravitational models with unknown physical content. This study
of unknown territory requires the same tool as the one used by Heisenberg
for exploring the unknown land of QFT, the S-matrix:
Such an S-matrix, which is tightly constrained by properties
such as unitarity and analyticity, can be a very powerful way to
summarize our ignorance of a theory. . . . We might anticipate
that such study in the context of gravity, supplemented by
additional physical input, could bear important fruit. [29]
Thus the anticipated physics is always mathematical.
4 Effective field theories
The S-matrix approach only asked ‘practical’ questions about the yet un-
known theory of strong interactions, formulated in the language of physical
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observables, and methodically avoided the need to have a full theory. In
the effective field theory (EFT) approach the unknown is not the theory
of nuclear interactions but new physics beyond the Standard Model. With
little prospect for distinguishing in the near future between the different
alternatives, EFT offers a method for developing a theory-independent
approach, in which observable effects are all that matters about new un-
known physics. Just as the S-matrix enables an exclusive focus on observ-
able quantities by disregarding the quantum field, EFT relieves one from
the need to worry about the physical content of high-energy theory. To
this end, EFT prescribes that the Lagrangian of the theory should include
all terms in the most general form compatible with symmetry principles.
Its assumes no particular physical content or physical meaning, with sym-
metry principles being the only constraints.
The notion of renormalizability in the context of quantum field theory
and its early representatives like quantum electrodynamics was developed
by Bethe, Schwinger, Tomonaga, Feynman, and Dyson. The latter intro-
duced crucial power-counting techniques for analyzing operator relevance.
Since his 1949 work [16, 17] and up to 1970s renormalizability was thought
to be a necessary condition for a field theory to make sense. Wilson’s work
on the renormalization group [56] has paved the way for a new attitude
due to a modified view on the reality of the renormalization cut-off. In
the older understanding, the cut-off scale was a residue of abstract math-
ematics introduced with the only goal of avoiding infinities in summation
series. The new appreciation of non-renormalizable theories came with
the understanding that the cut-off could be taken as physical and cor-
responding to the limit of applicability of a given theory. New physics
was to be expected beyond the same cut-off scale ΛNP . Since the domain
of applicability of particular field theories became limited by a number
denoting an energy scale, they began to be seen as effective rather than
fundamental theories whose validity only extends up to some frontier.
Wilson’s work and Weinberg’s reintroduction of EFTs as useful theories
with ‘phenomenological Lagrangians’ [49, 50, 51] boosted this new view.
Much of the historic development of EFTs focused on the top-down
approach stipulating that the fundamental physical theory is known but
inapplicable for practical purposes. This may be due to the complexity of
high-energy theory or, in the case of EFTs in condensed matter physics,
to heuristic arguments as suggested by Shankar: “Even when one knows
the theory at a microscopic level (i.e., the fundamental theory), there is
often a good reason to deliberately move away to an effective theory” [47].
A typical example from particle physics is the chiral perturbation theory,
which gives a low-energy approximation of quantum chromodynamics in
the light quark sector (for a review see [42]). Even when the physical
content is known, it is often instructive and necessary to build a physical
theory as if it had remained unknown. This effectively transforms EFTs
into blackbox models, with a history of the approach that treats the known
as if it had been unknown going back to the Euler-Heisenberg calculation
in the 1930s of photon-photon scattering at small energies within the
framework of Dirac’s quantum field theory [24, 23, 35].
High-energy physics often uses an alternative ‘bottom-up’ approach,
whose popularity reflects a change in the conception of EFTs. Today
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physicists tend to think of all physical theories, including the Standard
Model, as EFTs with respect to new physics at higher energies. Blackbox
models have become universal: it is not wrong to claim that to some
extent any quantum field theory is a theory of the unknown.
A typical model-building scenario, following Wilson, starts with a La-
grangian of an effective field theory valid up to scale Λ. This Lagrangian
can be generally written as a sum over local operator products:
L =
∞∑
n=0
λn
Λn
On. (1)
Coefficients λn are the coupling constants. They encode information on
the unknown physics at scales higher than Λ and can be fixed experimen-
tally; additionally, when the underlying high-energy theory happens to be
known, the values of the coupling constants appear through a renormal-
ization group calculation.
The only constraints on the form of operator product terms On come
from the symmetries of the theory. The tree level of the power series
in 1
Λ
is obtained by the usual Standard Model calculation. Effects of
new physics appear in loop corrections and influence the value of coupling
constants λn. The main value of Lagrangian (1) for high-energy physics is
that it can be used to study low-energy effects of new physics beyond the
Standard Model without having to specify what this new physics actually
is, apart from the assumption of its irrelevance to interactions below the
cut-off.
To give a realistic example, consider a ‘top-down’ electroweak EFT
that reproduces the Standard Model for the light degrees of freedom (light
quarks, leptons and gauge bosons) as long as energies are small compared
with the Higgs mass [42]. This EFT is Higgless in the sense that it cuts off
the Higgs sector by a choice of Λ. The lowest-order effective Lagrangian
fixes the masses of Z and W bosons at tree level and does not carry
information on the underlying symmetry breaking SU(2)L × U(1)Y →
U(1)QED down to the gauge group U(1) of quantum electrodynamics. At
the next order the most general effective chiral Lagrangian with only gauge
bosons and Goldstone fields,
L(4)EW =
14∑
i=0
aiOi, (2)
contains fifteen operators. This complexity is essential as it stems from the
requirement that we use the most general form of the Lagrangian compat-
ible with symmetry principles. Gell-Mann formulated a rule called “the
totalitarian principle,” which asserts that everything that is not forbidden
is compulsory [9]. For Lagrangian (2), constraints from symmetry include
invariance with respect to CP and SU(2)L × U(1)Y . Also, three of the
fifteen operators vanish as a consequence of the equations of motion un-
der the assumption of light fermions. With the remaining terms, one finds
various effects such as the usual electroweak oblique corrections (six oper-
ators involved at the bilinear, four at the trilinear and five at the quartic
levels), corrections to rare B and K decays, the CP -violating parameter,
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etc. This effective approximation of a very large Higgs mass in the Stan-
dard Model gives a field theory, whose operator content is not simple but
which nevertheless possesses phenomenological predictive power and pro-
vides an easier way to perform calculations than the complete Standard
Model Lagrangian.
As if he were developing an argument to counter Pauli’s critique of
Heisenberg’s S-matrix, Weinberg insists that the absence of any assump-
tion of simplicity about the EFT Lagrangian is what makes the EFT
method so efficient [52, p. 246]. He further supports the parallel by claim-
ing that “the S-matrix philosophy is not far from the modern philosophy
of effective field theories”. However, he also adds a critique of S-matrix:
“More important than any philosophical hang-ups was the fact that quan-
tum field theory didn’t seem to be going anywhere in accounting for the
strong and weak interactions”. The S-matrix was the only rational re-
action to a situation in which no one knew what language to use, nor in
which direction to look for a theory of the strong and weak interactions.
This was despair quite analogous to Einstein’s unease when he realized
that the theory he’d been developing could not be based on known facts
(Section 2). Similarly, today we do not know whether supersymmetry,
or extra dimensions, or yet another model, will turn out to be the right
solution for new physics. However, the blackbox approach to unknown
phenomena is generalized in EFTs to the point where it can be applied
above and beyond any despair. It has become a usual, and arguably a
normative, tool in quantum field theory.
Like Einstein or Heisenberg, we resort to a language that does not re-
quire knowledge of the dynamical laws or the constitutive types of matter.
Unlike Einstein or Heisenberg, we treat this situation as perfectly reason-
able. The method of building an EFT that starts from a general mathe-
matical framework of gauge theory, then proceeds with a Lagrangian com-
patible with the constraints coming from symmetry principles, is neither a
surprising nor a scandalous jump as Pauli may have thought about Hein-
senberg’s S-matrix. That mathematics plays an effective role in physics
of the unknown, if we look at it from the point of view of effective field
theories, becomes a new normal.
This view is a far cry from Wigner’s insistence on physical theories
as collections of laws of nature but it fits well with another one of his
ideas. When Wigner announces that the aim of mathematics is to de-
velop concepts that can be “manipulated [for] making striking, brilliant
arguments,” he insists that these concepts are not chosen for their con-
ceptual simplicity. Similarly, simplicity is not at work in the selection
of operators for an EFT Lagrangian dictated by Gell-Mann’s totalitarian
principle. The latter is driven by the concern of effectiveness in the pre-
diction of future events: this is precisely Wigner’s definition of physical
theory. What is more, this type of theory, like all blackbox models of
unknown physics, is constitutively grounded in the use of mathematics.
Wigner connected mathematics with a capacity to make striking ar-
guments. What is striking in EFTs is that an argument can be made at
all without the knowledge of complete theory. Summing up, we see in
the case of effective field theories an example of perfectly reasonable and
rational effectiveness of mathematics in physics.
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5 Device-independent models
Quantum cryptography works with systems of “unspecified character” [4]
or “unknown nature” [5]. This is performed in a device-independent ap-
proach: a theoretical investigation that does not rely on the knowledge of
laws governing the systems’ behaviour. A conventional ‘device’ refers
here to any process or apparatus described by an operational theory,
whether classical or quantum, which is explicitly designated. This ter-
minology was first introduced by Mayers and Yao [37], who developed
device-independent quantum cryptography with imperfect sources. Over
the years quantum cryptography has developed an array of such methods
for dealing with adversaries which effectively turn systems into untrusted
entities by acting upon sources. Device-independent protocols play an im-
portant role in experimental tasks such as randomness generation [14, 43],
quantum key distribution [6], estimation of the states of unknown sys-
tems [5], certification of multipartite entanglement [4], and distrustful
cryptography [1]. Some of these cryptographic protocols have found a
broader use in quantum information, e.g., device-independent tests are
performed on Bell inequalities or on the assumption that superluminal
signaling is impossible [3].
In full generality, device-independent models are defined as a set of n
parties, each of which ‘selects’ a measurement setting or ‘places’ an in-
put value x1 ∈ X1, . . . , xn ∈ Xn respectively, and ‘subsequently’ ‘obtains’
an output value or a measurement result a1 ∈ A1, . . . , an ∈ An. The
sets X1, . . . ,Xn and A1, . . . ,An are alphabets of finite cardinality. The
verbs used in these expressions merely convey an operational meaning
of the inputs and outputs; they do not imply that any party exercises
free will or has conscious decision-making procedures. The term ‘subse-
quently’ introduces a local time arrow pointing from each party’s input
to its output. Although such local time arrows seem quite intuitive, in
full generality they need not be assumed either. A fully general setting
requires, therefore, that absolutely nothing be postulated about the way
inputs are transformed into outputs, except two conditions: a) these two
types of data are clearly distinguished; b) the process of transformation is
physical. Physics is contained in the generalized probability distribution
p = P (a1, . . . , an|x1, . . . , xn) (Figure 1).
All device-independent models studied in the literature introduce fur-
ther constraints on p. A customary one is the no-signalling principle
mentioned in Section 2: a choice of measurement by one party must not
influence the statistics of the outcomes registered by a different party.
Mathematically, the distribution p is non-signalling if and only if all one-
party marginal probabilities are functions of their respective inputs xi:
P (ai|x1, . . . , xn) = P (ai|xi). (3)
Although very common, this assumption is not universal: when device-
independent methods are used to test general causal inequalities, the im-
possibility of signalling is not a prerequisite [7].
One of the earliest examples of device-independent methods in quan-
tum information involves what is literally called a box. The no-signalling
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Figure 1: In the case of n = 3 parties, physics is fully contained in the proba-
bilities p = P (a1a2a3|x1x2x3).
constraint was studied by Popescu and Rohrlich [45] through the intro-
duction of a non-local, or Popescu-Rohrlich (PR), box describing un-
known processes which connect the inputs x, y ∈ {0, 1} and the outputs
a, b ∈ {0, 1} of two parties according to the joint distribution:
P (ab|xy) =
{
1/2 : a+ b = xy mod 2
0 : otherwise.
(4)
While a PR-box is a general algebraic framework designed to go beyond
quantum theory, the application of the no-signalling principle implies that
this box will respect the laws of special relativity. Its device-independent
non-local structure accommodates a violation of the Tsirelson bound [12]
by reaching the maximum amount of correlations in the CHSH inequal-
ity [8, 13].
Hailed as a “very important recent development” [44], device-indepen-
dent models are characterized by the absence of assumptions about the
internal workings of the box. Its ‘interior’ is not described by a particular
physical theory. The box is unknown territory which, since it is assumed
to be of interest for physical theory, is also a territory of science. The
entire setup belongs within the boundaries of physics; at the same time,
as we argue elsewhere, it opens new possibilities to redefine these very
boundaries [30].
The redefinition of the boundaries of physics achieved by device-in-
dependent methods in quantum cryptography and quantum information
is entirely due to the use of mathematics. The prediction of future events,
to use Wigner’s term, is made possible by a connection, which remains
to be found, between the inputs and the outputs. In the absence of any
additional assumptions, the search for such a connection is performed in
the space of mathematical tools available to the physicist. This is a com-
mon trait of blackbox models that deal with unknown physics. In the
operational framework based on generalized probability distributions, the
physicist’s only elementary notions are the inputs and the outputs. She
then applies mathematical constraints, like the no-signaling principle, to
obtain a particular theory with predictive power. Not only is the effective-
ness of mathematics unsurprising: it becomes a driving force that propels
device-independent theory building.
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6 Analysis and Conclusion
Wigner’s argument about unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in
physical theory relied on an intuitive feeling that nothing, in principle,
urges nature to be mathematical. Unlike, for example, Galileo, Wigner did
not seek to ground his statement in a particular philosophical system. He
expressed the immediate surprise of someone who discovers that mathe-
matical formulae can correctly predict future events and account for reality
outside human mind. Evidently, a Pythagorean or a neo-Platonist would
not be puzzled, for these philosophical systems put the number among
fundamental constitutive principles of nature. But Wigner’s amazement
produced an urge to motivate the underlying connection by means other
than the application of a doctrine.
In rational terms the Wignerian wonder can be understood as two
questions: one about the substance and another about the aim of physical
theory. The first one is: why are objective phenomena and matter in the
world outside human mind described by mathematical laws? However,
physical theory does not always deal with phenomena or matter that are
known or already available. This is but a limitation that has led Wigner
to the view of physical theory as a collection of laws of nature. Physics
must often explore the unknown and one of its tasks is to determine
what kind of matter is involved in an experiment or what events can be
predicted, and subsequently observed, in support of a theory. In this case,
the impulse for creating a theory stems from the desire to study new and
unknown territory. Its deeper motivation usually relates to a feeling of
dissatisfaction with the available old theories; it is rare that one would
obtain at an early stage a sufficiently precise idea about the content of
the new one. On other occasions old theories are too complex or unsuited
for the needs of solving particular problems. Even if complete knowledge
is available, it may be reasonable to treat it as if it had remained unknown.
Thus physics of the unknown is established as a collection of exploratory
instruments whose nature, as we saw on four examples, is mathematical.
This last point shifts focus to Wigner’s second question about the di-
vergence of aims between physics and mathematics. Had Wigner taken a
suitably broad definition of physical theory to include the physics of the
unknown, he would have seen this divergence quickly evaporate. This is
because the physical theory of the unknown takes the form of a blackbox
model purporting to establish a link between the inputs and the outputs
of the box. The link must be conceptual and striking, i.e., mathematical
in Wignerian terms, but it must also provide the power of prediction of
future events, i.e. it should position the theory within the boundaries of
physics. This is the ‘box’ language of the device-independent approach.
Equivalently, one may say with Heisenberg that the theory should only
operate with observable quantities. Wheeler expressed the same idea by
focusing his introduction of the S-matrix on asymptotically free particle
states. In effective field theories, the unknown high-energy theory is re-
placed by operators describing all possible effects observable at a given
energy scale.
What is unknown is placed in a black box, which the theory does not
necessarily seek to open up. As shown by Einstein’s principle theories,
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this approach does not, and often cannot, help to uncover the content of
the box. In spite of its non-constructive character, it can still be predic-
tive and explanatory. Explanation in this case originates, not from any
knowledge of what lies inside the box, but from the postulates that con-
strain the connection between the inputs and the outputs. If a theory
is successful in predicting future events, then these principles become our
best candidates for fundamental principles of nature. This new knowledge
about the world does not come in the form of a dynamical law for a new
kind of matter. Instead our worldview is put on a new foundation, whose
status is established through an enquiry enabled by mathematics.
Wigner stopped short of claiming this essential theory-building role of
mathematics. He calls it “somewhat irresponsible” as he identifies it with
the following attitude: “When [the physicist] finds a connection between
two quantities which resembles a connection well-known from mathemat-
ics, he will jump at the conclusion that the connection is that discussed
in mathematics simply because he does not know of any other similar
connection.” This phrase appears after a brief reference to Einstein’s
appreciation of beauty, which in Wigner’s words “comes closest to an ex-
planation for the mathematical concepts’ cropping up in physics.” Had
he been reading Einstein’s correspondence that predated his article by
only a few years, Wigner might have noticed that the “jump” that he was
talking about was strictly analogous to another such jump, or an “eleva-
tion,” which Einstein placed at the center of his epistemology [22]. As he
was drawing a schema of theory building in physics in a letter to Mau-
rice Solovine, Einstein stipulated that there exists “no logical path from
the E[xperiences] to the A[xioms], but only an intuitive (psychological)
connection” and, furthermore, that “the relations between the concepts
that appear in [theorems] and the experiences are not of a logical nature.”
Therefore, the correspondence between theoretic results and experimen-
tal findings, although “obtainable with great certainty,” requires a jump
which is performed by the physicist. The validity of a result obtained by
such means, as Olivier Darrigol puts it, “comes as a surprise” [15, p. 344],
hence perhaps Wigner’s complaint about a “somewhat irresponsible” at-
titude of the physicist.
It appears that this Einstein-inspired surprise is very much the same
as Wigner’s. The latter, however, has a different rationale. Like Heisen-
berg’s reason for using the S-matrix, Wigner’s account of theory building
refers to the physicist’s ignorance. Unlike Heisenberg’s appeal to igno-
rance, though, the Wignerian claim should lead to a connection with
[only?] “well-known” mathematical concepts. Wigner then, seeing per-
haps his mistake, tries to clarify this point: “It is true also that the
concepts which were chosen were not selected arbitrarily from a listing of
mathematical terms but were developed, in many if not most cases, inde-
pendently by the physicist and recognized then as having been conceived
before by the mathematician.” If one puts together this prescription and
Heisenberg’s conviction that only observable quantities should be used in
theory building, one gets very close to the general characterization of the
blackbox approach. It seems that in the discussion of the aims of mathe-
matics Wigner stopped really short of finding a satisfactory answer to his
bewilderment about its connection to physics.
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This shows that the connection between the inputs and the outputs
of a black box in a device-independent approach is inherently conceptual
and striking or, in other words, mathematical. To paraphrase Einstein,
its mathematical character is not subject to logical deduction. Once es-
tablished, this connection becomes a basis for physical explanation.
To sum up: to develop a blackbox model means to identify a math-
ematical link, i.e. the right mathematical concept and often the right
mathematical language, for connecting the inputs and the outputs. This
search is performed in the space of concepts and theories rather than in
the empirical world of physical experimentation. A success, for sure, can
only be proclaimed if the identified mathematical object helps to make
empirically testable predictions of future events or to explain previously
unaccounted phenomena. Whenever one achieves such success, the math-
ematical nature of the connection between the inputs and the outputs
helps to provide both the constitutive and the explanatory powers of the
theory. Contrary to Wigner’s claim about a “somewhat irresponsible”
intrusion of mystery, the effectiveness of mathematics in describing the
physics of the unknown—new and uncharted territory of science or na-
ture yet unexplored—cannot but be deemed reasonable and unsurprising.
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